Does our ability to predict the performance of new ventures improve in the years after start-up? We investigate the growth and survival of 6247 new ventures that are tracked using the customer records at Barclays Bank. We put forward Gambler?s Ruin as a valid theory for understanding new venture growth and survival. Gambler?s Ruin predicts that the R2 remains low for growth rate regressions, but that the R2 increases in the years since start-up for survival regressions. The Nagelkerke R2 obtained from growth rate regressions decreases significantly in the years after start-up, which suggests that the fog gets thicker with respect to growth. However, the Nagelkerke R2 of survival regressions increases in the years after start-up. Interestingly, a blip in year 5 suggests that macro-economic factors may have a strong effect on the amount of ?fog.?
ABSTRACT: Does our ability to predict the performance of new ventures improve in the years after startup? We investigate the growth and survival of 6247 new ventures that are tracked using the customer records at Barclays Bank. We put forward Gambler s Ruin as a valid theory for understanding new venture growth and survival. Gambler s Ruin predicts that the R 2 remains low for growth rate regressions, but that the R 2 increases in the years since start-up for survival regressions. The Nagelkerke R 2 obtained from growth rate regressions decreases significantly in the years after start-up, which suggests that the fog gets thicker with respect to growth. However, the Nagelkerke R 2 of survival regressions increases in the years after start-up. Interestingly, a blip in year 5 suggests that macro-economic factors may have a JEL CODES: L26, L25
KEYWORDS: Entrepreneurship, firm growth, survival analysis, coefficient of determination, selection environment, G Ruin theory, Strategic Entrepreneurship
INTRODUCTION
New ventures are characterised by a high likelihood of closure and by considerable variation between firms and over short periods of time within firms. Given this variation, the challenge facing scholars is to offer insights into the factors influencing that performance. Unfortunately, being able --venture is young. Are there explanations for why some prosper but most do not? Even more challenging is whether these explanations can then be used to forecast the survival and/or growth of individual, or groups of, new ventures.
However there is considerable value for business owners, providers of finance and governments in being able to predict post-start performance. For business owners the value is the availability of a route-map to enable them to check progress over time. For providers of finance, being able to more accurately estimate the optimum date to provide finance is valuable because too early an investment may be too risky, whereas delay may mean the opportunity is seized by a rival. Finally, governments are continually faced with the c -ups or instead to delay support until performance metrics become clearer. An optimal combination of support at different stages as new ventures evolve could provide considerable social and economic returns. This paper is motivated by a desire to capture the benefits to all three parties of being able to predict post-start performance. To begin with, it G ' G' which holds that growth is random but that survival depends on accumulated resources (lagged size, which is the sum of start-up size and growth since start-up). GR is then used to derive predictions for the evolution of the R 2 for growth and survival in the years after start-up. GR therefore suggests that the growth fog is thick, and remains thick over time. With regards to survival, however, GR predicts that survival becomes more predictable in the years after entry, as surviving new ventures acquire resources that ssitudes of trade that characterise the new venture in its early months and years. These theoretical predictions are then tested on a sample of 6247 new ventures, all of which began to trade in the UK in the same quarter of 2004. Our chosen approach is Gam ' G' seek to explain the performance of new ventures where performance includes both growth and survival.
The key empirical novelty of the paper is, by taking the Nagelkerke R 2 statistic as a measure of the density of the fog, to investigate how the fog changes as the new venture matures. We seek to explain the variation across firms in terms of survival and growth, by considering their observed characteristics. How important are observed characteristics in explaining survival and growth, and how does their explanatory power change in the years since entry? We show the evolution of the Nagelkerke R 2 statistic obtained from growth regressions and survival regressions in the 6 years after entry, and observe that while the ability to predict variation across firms in growth rates deteriorates in the years after entry, the ability to predict variation across firms in survival improves somewhat.
This approach is only possible because the large dataset available to us monitors all financial transactions by a new venture from the day it begins trading. These trends in the R 2 coefficient are not linear or monotonic, however, and we suspect that macroeconomic phenomena (such as the performance landscape.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses the GR, which leads up to the development of hypotheses in Section 3. Section presents our methodology. Section 5 presents the dataset, and we test our hypotheses in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
THEORY
According to insights from Stategic Entrepreneurship, there are specific and identifiable characteristics of the business or its owner(s) that enable the new venture to shape its economic environment. The definition used by Ireland et al (2003, p963) is that: Strategic entrepreneurship (SE) involves simultaneous opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking behaviours and results in T -seeking and advantagereflect the psychological make-up of the owner referred to as the entrepreneurial mind-set, most clearly reflected in the ability to recognise opportunities. However the duality of Strategic Entrepreneurship is its combination of both recognising, but also exploiting, opportunities. The latter is captured by the ability to manage strategically three forms of entrepreneurial capital: financial, human and social capital. At the heart of strategic entrepreneurship is knowledge or talent which may be in the form of the human capital of the owners and co-workers but also crucially, an ability to learn from past trading experience.
However what is distinctive about SE is that it explicitly links these identifiable characteristics of individuals, or combinations of individuals ' growth, however, has found it particularly difficult to predict firm performance (Coad, 2009; McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010) . On the one hand, the lack of persistence in firm growth rates suggests that most firms are not able to configure the elusive bundle of strategic resources that will confer lasting superior performance. On the other hand, sustained competitive advantage is not incompatible with a random walk model of firm growth (Denrell, 2004) . Although some factors are associated with faster growth (such as size and age, with small, younger firms generally growing faster), nonetheless the predictive power of these models is low, such that the suggested benchmark or reference point is that firm growth rates are approximately random. Geroski (2000, p169) summarizes thus: "The most elementary 'fact' about corporate growth thrown up by econometric work on both large and small firms is that firm size follows a random walk"
We therefore take a random walk model of firm growth as our baseline theoretical model, as proposed by Gibrat (1931) as a statistical explanation for the observed log-normal firm size distribution. Here the probability of a proportionate change in size over time is the same for all firms in a given industry, irrespective of their size at the beginning of the period (Mansfield, 1962 ) G Law therefore implies the firm lacks control over the environment in which it either buys inputs or sells its output reflecting the textbook model of perfect competition. G L terms of the following random process:
where x t is the logarithm of firm size at time t, and multiplicative on a linear scale).
model with survival being a function of the stock of accumulated resources. The case where the gambler leaves the table because of an exhausted supply of resources is comparable to the business owner who has no finance with which to continue trading. T " er it is above a minimum threshold size x*:
Where x l is a latent variable that corresponds to x if x l >x*, but remains unobserved if x l <=x*. If x*>0, then players will not persist until bankruptcy, but will quit the table before they have completely exhausted their stocks of resources.
Modifications and extensions of this survival condition can also be mentioned. For example, there is the rare case of the individual who is a major winner and who is able to sell the business without ever having to work again. 1 Another possible motive for business exit is the case where the business owner quits because of the current availability of more attractive options such as waged employment or retirement or is influenced by how they expect the business to perform in the future (Gimeno et al, 1997) .
key concept of the stock of financial resources. These are assumed to enhance the survival of the firm, meaning that firms with access to them are more likely to survive, and weather the inevitable series of adverse shocks, than otherwise similar firms without such resources. In the GR model these resources are exclusively financial. They do not include the wider concept of resources captured within the Resource-Based View of the firm (Barney 2001) .
survival (see also Levinthal, 1991 ).
1 T A UK which two thirds cease to trade in six years. Of these, less than 2% have sales of £1m in six years A of an IPO launch, Ritter (2011) shows that, even in the US, there were only 7617 between 1980 and 2011, or less than 250 per year. So, if the UK had the same rate of conversion to IPOs as the US and none of the IPOs were acquisitions, then it would imply a chance of approximately 1 in 10,000 new businesses becoming an IPO.
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They however note: "we found survival and growth to be governed by similar stochastic processes." P.387
In summary, GR assumes business growth is a random walk but that access to financial resources influences the survival of the business and so, indirectly, its performance. GR predicts that two finance-related factors positively influence new firm survival. The first is that those that begin large, because they have access to prior wealth faced by a new venture. The second is the role of (i.e., growth since start-up). These generate not only internal resources but also external resources from providers in an opaque marketplace that interpret these as a signal of quality or talent.
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS
We now derive some hypotheses to be tested in Section 5. We are primarily interested in investigating the goodness-of-fit of models that seek to explain the survival and growth of new ventures. Hypothesis 1 relates to the R 2 statistics obtained from growth rate regressions, while
Hypothesis 2 relates to the R 2 statistics obtained from survival regressions.
given that the dynamics of (log) size are x t = x t-1 + t , the growth rate (in log-differences) is expressed entirely in terms of a random shock: x t -x t-1 = t . Growth remains random in the years after start-up it does not depend on start-up size or other firm-level factors. Therefore G Ruin would predict that the R 2 from growth regressions is low and remains low over time. (We consider it trivial that the R 2 will be low and driven by stochastic noise, therefore we do not see the need to use a simulation model here to demonstrate the evolution of the R 2 .)
Hypothesis 1: the R 2 from growth regressions will be low and remain low in the years after startup In order to hypothesise the expected changes in the R 2 from survival regressions, we need to G ' A firm size at time t is denoted as x t , with start-up size being denoted as x 0 . Firm size evolves as a random walk, with x t = x t-1 t t follows a Gaussian di 2 W resource stock over time. According to the Gambler's Ruin model, firm are assumed to exit when their size (proxied by their resource stock) reaches zero. The analogy is that of a gambler who leaves the gambling table when they have run out of gambling chips.
We rewrite the model in continuous time, with dx(t) = dt + dz(t), where dz(t) is a standard Wiener process. The time taken until the firm first reaches the bankruptcy condition x t = 0 can be expressed as the cumulative distribution function of a random variable in the following way (known as the Bachelier-Lévy formula): (3) where N(.) represents the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution. Time to exit is 2 of the growth shocks, and start-up size x 0 . Even though growth may be a random process, the expected survival time can be increased by increasing the size at start-up x 0 . The R 2 from survival regressions therefore depends on both start-up size and growth since start-up.
. We generate an artificial dataset of 50,000 firms, whose start-up size is calibrated according to the lognormal distribution with mean 10.55 and standard deviation 1.5, in order to closely follow the empirical start-up size distribution. We then generate a distribution of growth rates, distributed according to the Laplace or symmetric exponential (Stanley et al 1996 and Bottazzi and Secchi 2006) , with mean -0.1 and standard deviation 0.9 (again, closely following observed values). Firm size evolves as a random walk, x t = x t-1 t , given the distributions of start-up size and growth rates given above, for t=60 periods. The exit threshold x* is set at 7 in the baseline case, which is deliberately chosen to be a relatively high value that will guarantee that in each period some firms will exit (thus avoiding a degenerate value for the R 2 in a survival regression in which all firms survive). For each individual period up to t=60 we estimate a probit survival regression (with a constant term and a single explanatory variable: lagged size) and record the Nagelkerke R 2 statistic. Figure 1 shows that the R 2 clearly increases in the years since start-up. This increase in R 2 presumably occurs because, with the passage of time, surviving firms overcome the liability of newness and grow to become sufficiently large that they no longer operate on the brink of the exit threshold. Firms that start small, on the other hand, will be weeded out through a selection effect, and as they exit in the years since start-up, the selection environment will becom -lived firms are removed. The central point here is that the R 2 value rises over time even when performance is a random walk.
While G ' " tegic Entrepreneurship offers other reasons why the survival R 2 may increase in the years since start-up. First, firms might be able to apply their human capital to learn and gain experience from their business activity, improve their productivity and viability over time, and develop capabilities that enhance their survival prospects. These variables can be expected to affect startgrowth rates in other words, the set {x 0 , x* If these Strategic Entrepreneurship variables are significant, then the increase in R 2 since start-up may be even higher than that observed for the
markets, in reality banks and lenders might be more willing to provide support to businesses that field.
With regards to the R 2 obtained from survival regressions, we therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: The R 2 from survival regressions will increase in the years after start-up Figure 1 : evolution of the Nagelkerke R 2 using simulated data, for 60 periods. y-axis: Nagelkerke R 2 obtained from probit regressions where exit depends on lagged size. x-axis: time period. Baseline case (with exit threshold x*=7) appears as a solid line; x*=8 for the long-dash line; x*=9 for the shortdash line. Linear trendline plotted for the baseline case.
.METHODOLOGY
Of crucial interest to our paper is the measure of what we call the coefficient of determination, or R 2 statistic, which is the proportion of variance explained in contrast to that which remains unexplained. However, or explanatory power that are preferable to the usual R 2 statistic because they have more desirable properties. For , although we show that our results are not sensitive to this choice of R 2 statistic.
As a starting point, we run regressions for each year, where the dependent variable is either growth rate or survival probability. For each year we obtain an R 2 statistic. These regressions are shown in Tables 4 and 5 .
We begin by plotting the evolution of the Nagelkerke R 2 over time using line charts one chart for growth, one for survival. This gives a simple overview of the change over time whether the trend is generally increasing or decreasing over the years. However, to assess whether the differences are statistically significant we will need to apply some tests that involve associating a standard error to the Nagelkerke R 2 statistic.
How can we assess the significance of the changes in the R 2 statistic? In some regressions, a significant change in R 2 is investigated by comparing the R 2 before and after adding some extra variables. In this situation, the same sample of observations is used in both cases, and the same baseline variables are included, but the R 2 changes as new variables are added (e.g. Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008, p390) . However, what we have in mind is different we want to compare the R 2 over different years (i.e. with different cross-sectional subsamples for the different years), although we use the same number of observations and the same set of explanatory variables, to see if the same explanatory variables provide a better fit as firms get older. We therefore follow the following procedure:
THE DATASET: BARCLAYS BANK CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS

BOOTSTRAP ALGORITHM:
1) Randomly draw a sample of size n=1000 observations for a given year (bootstrapping without replacement)
2) Perform a survival or growth regression on these n=1000 observations, then repeat for r=1000 replications (with other randomly-selected samples of n=1000) to obtain a distribution of r=1000 estimates of the sample R 2 statistic
3) Obtain the mean, and the standard error of the mean, for the distribution of R 2 statistics for a given year 4) Repeat for all available years 5) Apply two-sample t-tests to see if the means of the distributions of R 2 statistics are significantly different.
To adequately test the above theories we require a dataset that permits the analysis of survival and growth of new businesses. In the UK the bulk 4 of prior empirical work on this topic has used data sources that are restricted to limited companies (Foreman-Peck, 1985) or to firms appearing in official public records (Van Stel and Storey, 2004) , or to selected survey respondents (Westhead et al 2005) or on the self-employed (Burke et al, 2008; Dawson and Henley, 2013) . Compared with the data source used in this paper new business customers of Barclays Bank these data sets suffer from up to five serious problems. First, their coverage is not only incomplete but subject to the bias noted by Yang and Aldrich (2012) particularly the inadequate coverage of the smallest and newest enterprises. The second is that of incomplete performance data. For example the self-employment data only identify whether or not an individual is self-employed and not on the performance of the enterprise. The third limitation of many studies is a reliance on self-report data without the full significance of such individuals being recognised as highly optimistic (Storey, 2011; Cassar, 2010) . Our data avoids the use of self-report information, other than that provided by the individual(s) prior to start-up. A fourth problem is that new venture studies can be restricted to a single sector, thus making generalisations difficult (Fan, 2010) . The data set used here covers all sectors of the UK economy with the exception of financial services. Fifth, the size of the data set is considerable; with all financial transaction examined amongst 6247 businesses that began to trade for the first time in 
Start-up: definition
Our dataset was drawn from non-financial firms identified as start-ups who entered Barclays customer base between March and May 2004. We exclude established businesses that switch from another Bank. We are aware that a new business does not necessarily start trading immediately upon opening an account. Indeed, for Barclays customers, approximately five percent of start-ups show no activity through their account in the subsequent 12 months. We addressed this by only including firms that showed activity in the month following entry to the customer base.
6
We therefore focus on a cohort of firms that have the same start date. We consider this to be important, because firms starting in different years may not be readily comparable (especially if the 4 The notable exception is Cressy (1996) which used data from National Westminster Bank now Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS).
5
We also included a small proportion of firms who did not show activity in their first full month, but in either May or June 2004. In these cases the start month of the firm was recorded as the month prior to activity. 6 The UK, unlike many countries in continental Europe, is not characterised by multiple banking (Ongena and Smith (2000) ).
The account at a single bank is therefore likely to capture the full trading activities of the new venture.
macroeconomic conditions at start-up have persistent effects on firm development in subsequent years). Focusing on a single cohort means that firms face the same macroeconomic conditions at each year of their development, and can therefore be meaningfully compared to each other.
Start-up: data
Basic owner(s) data was collected on gender and age and, at start-up, respondents were also asked to fill in a questionnaire. To capture one element of human capital identified in Table 1 customers were asked about the highest level of educational qualification obtained by the owner(s). As with other studies (van der Sluis et al 2005) this was intended to act as a proxy for the human capital available to the new firm. The second sought information about prior business experience (Westhead et al 2005) . This included previous ownership and/or ownership among immediate family members, so capturing both work-related capital and family support. Finally, to capture access to non-financial resources, owners were asked about the sources of advice and support they used of prior to start-up.
We then supplement this data with information collected by the bank as part of its general account opening process. These are the age of the owner(s), the legal form of the business, the activity type (sector/branch/market) and its location (standard region) within the UK. Table 2 sets out the data in full.
Ongoing data
To measure the size of the business we used credit turnover the value of payments into a current account. 7 This serves as a very close approximation to sales revenue inclusive of taxes. The much greater granularity of turnover compared with using measures of employee numbers is a particular strength. Drawing such data from bank records also provides other advantages. One is the direct observation of data without the need to survey businesses 8 . Another is the greater frequency with which the data can be observed. Every financial transaction is documented and credit turnover is available monthly rather than being limited to 12 month periods. For our dataset turnover was aggregated across periods from the date of start-up.
7
Excluding payments from related accounts, e.g. deposit accounts held by the business.
8
This can also be obtained from business accounts, although it can be time-consuming to access these for small firms and, in the case of the UK, a large proportion of the corporate population is not required to supply this information. The frequency of turnover data permits the creation of variables that would not otherwise be possible, but which are vital in the testing of GR. It will be recalled this places considerable emphasis on sales not falling vel, determined by the resources available to the owner, and thus inducing exit. The variance of sales, particularly amongst very young firms is therefore likely to be a strong influence on the stay/quit decision. The unique monthly data available to us means it is possible to create a measure of turnove 9
In addition to the level, growth and variability of turnover, bank records also provide the opportunity to formulate measures of the quality of financial management. For this dataset the key variable was unauthorised overdraft use. The overdraft is an important financial product in the UK and has traditionally been used as the first source of working capital for small firms. With prior agreement from the relevant bank, the overdraft permits a bank customer to make payments, when the balance in their current account falls below zero. Provided that their balance remains above a given amount then the customer only pays interest on the amount of overdraft used. 10 However, customers can, in most cases, exceed their overdraft limit. 11 If this occurs the bank usually applies both a flat charge and a considerably higher interest rate to the entire balance. The financial costs to exceeding an overdraft are therefore high. While, in extreme circumstances, firms may judge that it is worth incurring these costs, persistent unauthorised use points to poor financial management on the part of the owner(s).
Our dataset includes two variables relating to unauthorised overdraft use. The first is a simple binary variable about whether the business was in unauthorised overdraft at any point during a six month period. The second records the proportion of that period spent in this position. To ensure these measures do not simply reflect more general overdraft use, i.e. that excess use provides additional information, we also include two further variables. One shows whether the firm used their overdraft at all and the other shows the mean proportion of the limit used over the period.
A full listing of the on-going variables is provided in the lower section of Table 2 .
Exit and closure
As noted earlier, establishing when a business has closed is perhaps the most challenging aspect of any study of survival and growth. Even for datasets taken from near comprehensive official sources, the date at which exit occurs may be some time after actual closure. 12 9 We define volatility as the standard deviation of turnover (measured monthly) for each firm across a six month period divided by total turnover. This scales the measure to the size of the business.
10
Although there may be a periodic charge to maintain it and the bank is able to change or withdraw it at short notice.
11
Including where the business has no agreed limit. 12 For example Storey et al (1987, p45) , L C , identified seven decision-rules that were required to identify the year in which the enterprise ceased to trade.
When using bank records, there are two main issues to resolve. The first is to distinguish between those businesses that have closed and those that have switched to another bank. For our dataset we used Barclays closure reason codes that record why any given account has been closed. We identified 6.36% of our initial sample as having switched over the six years covered by the dataset, i.e. they had closed their account with Barclays, but continued to trade.
13
The second issue is judging when a given business has actually closed. While the majority of Barclays customers ceasing to trade clearly close at a specific time when no more transactions take place, an important minority become dormant, i.e. their account remains open, but with no activity.
14 For the firms in our sample we used a simple rule if the business had shown no turnover in consecutive six month periods then it was deemed to have closed in the first of these periods.
15
It is important to note that this process identifies closures. It B the latter we mean those firms that cease to trade with some external financial liability. Of course, as noted earlier, a closing firm may, or may not, have met the objectives of its owner(s), although closure may equally reflect that a better opportunity has presented itself. Table 3 provides an overview of the size and growth of businesses in our sample. Many of the firms in our sample are remarkably small, especially in comparison to conventional datasets. For example, the median turnover in year 1 is GBP 39,276 which is far smaller than the VAT threshold of GBP 73,000 (above which firms start to appear in national administrative datasets). To investigate how our analysis is affected by our rich coverage of micro firms, we complement our baseline results with those obtained from restricting our sample to larger firms (that is, with above-median start-up size), hence making our sample more similar to other work on new ventures that over-samples larger firms (Yang and Aldrich, 2012) . 13 This could be an understatement of the true number as imperfections in the coding process meant that not all switchers were recorded. However, other work suggests we have found most (if not all). Fraser (2005, p90) reports that the annual rate of bank switching is just over 2% over all types of (SME) businesses.
Summary statistics
14 Indeed, some of these may have switched rather than closed.
15
Some Barclays customers can show little or no activity for a number of months before seeing turnover return to non-T . 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
We begin with some plots of the evolution of the R 2 statistic over time (Section 5.1), before assessing statistical significance using our Bootstrap Algorithm (Section 5.2).
Plotting the R 2 statistics
Growth Table 4 examines the factors influencing the growth rates of new firms in the sample. The first five columns show the results for Years 2 to 6 inclusive. The remaining five columns show the results for firms with above-median start-up size only.
An examination of columns 1-5 shows the explanatory power defined as the Nagelkerke R 2 falls over time from 0.224 in Year 2 to 0.170 in Year 6. This decline implies that the fog appears to thicken slightly rather than lift.
At the level of the individual variables, in all five equations, lagged size negatively affects the growth rate implying smaller firms have faster growth rates. However, the general absence of significant human capital variables in the equations, 16 and the low values of R 2 , provides little evidence in support of SE. For example, key elements of SE such as accessing advice, or any form of prior business experience do not appear to positively enhance growth. 17 Other variables appear as significant in the equations for some years, but not consistently throughout all years, suggesting that different factors matter in different years. Examples of these include Age and Age 2 (Year 2 only); Education (Years 2, 5 and 6); Family business experience (Year 5 only); male owners (Year 2 only); multiple owners (Years 2 and 3 only).
However, two other variables or groups of variables are consistently significant. The first is legal form showing that enterprises choosing limited company status at start-up were, in all years, more likely to show growth than those choosing to be either a partnership or sole traders.
18 Second, a range of trading variables also strongly influence growth: these are that firms with highly volatile sales on a monthly basis were less likely to grow, as were those with an overdraft facility which they exceeded.
I G'
, especially for survival. We capture this concept as lagged growth implying that growth in the previous year both provides the resources for future growth directly but also indirectly through signalling the viability of the enterprise to external funders. Previous work has found that lagged growth has a significant effect on future growth as well as survival (Coad, 2009) . For this reason Figures 1a and 1b takes the same time period and uses the same set of variables as in Table 4 but with the inclusion of lagged growth (at the cost of losing one year of observations). This lagged-growth variable is only marginally significant (if at all) in explaining growth, and there is no big improvement in the R 2 values in the equation.
Our second test is the examination of whether the explanatory power of our models changes over time whether indeed the fog lifts. Figure 1a plots the evolution of the R 2 statistics from Table 4 , showing the R 2 values for four subsamples. The R 2 for the baseline sample is shown as a solid line. This we argue captures the SE Model by including a wide range of human capital variables. Other lines in Figure 1a correspond to a sample including lagged growth (at the expense of losing one year of observations), 19 as well as the subsample of firms with above-median start-up size (with or without lagged growth). 16 We undertook tests of joint significance of the human capital variables (that is, business experience, education and advice variables) and in most cases they were jointly insignificant, although they were jointly significant at the 5% level in year 5 and year 6. 17 The one exception is that in Year 6 Start-Right Service does have a significantly positive sign. 18 Choice of legal form has been shown in prior empirical work to be associated with faster growth amongst new/young firms (Storey 1994) . 19 We include the R 2 obtained from regressions controlling for lagged growth in the line charts, because lagged growth is a G ' H Figure 1a : OLS Growth regression Nagelkerke R 2 statistics for the first 6 years, for 4 different growth rate regressions. larger enterprises are slightly higher than for the baseline sample. This is in keeping with the Yang and Aldrich (2012) observation that much recent research has inflated our apparent ability to correctly explain outcomes by examining only those new enterprises sufficiently large and wellestablished to be included in publicly available data bases. Figure 1b focuses on a subsample of firms that are ex post observed to have survived until the end of our sample period. Is it easier to predict the performance of firms that we know will survive for longer? Focusing on these ex post survivors allows us to leave aside the selection effect and focus only on the learning effect. Figure 1b shows non-monotonic fluctuations in the R 2 coefficient. In each case, the R 2 dips down slightly in the intermediate years before rising in the later years. In some cases ' 2 is slightly higher than the initial R 2 , while in t ' 2 is slightly lower than the initial value. All in all, however, we do not find evidence of a smoothly-increasing R 2 that would be expected from learning effects. In fact, the R 2 from regressions focusing on ex post survivors ranges from 0.12-0.23 and is lower than the R 2 obtained from focusing on the full sample (which includes short-lived firms).
Survival
To test our Hypothesis 2 relating to survival we run year-by-year regressions in Table 5 , and plot the evolution of the R 2 statistic in Figure 2 . A first observation, in line with previous work, 20 is that lagged size (that is, lagged log turnover) is a significant determinant of survival and indeed, it is one of the few significant determinants. The only consistent human capital determinant of new firm survival is owner age. Amongst the other human capital variables, most never appear as significant in any equation prior experience, most advice sources. Furthermore, in some years we observe somewhat unexpected signs. For example education has a negative sign in year 4 and males a positive sign in year 1.
21
An examination of the survival equations shows, as with the growth equations, that choice of legal form limited company status clearly enhances survival. There are also some sectoral and regional influences, but the explanatory power of the baseline model in Table 5 is low. We therefore repeat the analysis with a subsample of above-median start-up size firms (last five columns of Table 5 ).
This makes a substantial difference. Apart from age, the age-related human capital variables become largely non-significant, although legal form and some regional and sectoral variables continue to be significant. Instead, it is the Trading variables that exert a powerful influence on survival in the directions expected. Survival rates are much lower in enterprises having high volatility in sales income and by two measures of overdraft excess. It also shows the powerful role of (log of) current size, with larger firms having higher survival rates.
In Figure 2 we show the Nagelkerke R 2 statistics for these subsamples. It has several similarities to Figure 1 but one major difference. The first similarity is that the R 2 values are broadly comparable ranging from around 0.16 to 0.25 for the baseline sample (but rising to 0.30 for firms with abovemedian start-up size). The second similarity is that the inclusion of a lagged growth variable as implied by G ' in improves the explanatory power of the model. The third similarity is that excluding the smallest firms also improves the values of the Nagelkerke R 2 .
The key difference is that values generally rise over the years whereas they fell in Figure 1 . It in the years after entry, but the fog remains dense when the task is to explain growth. 
Statistical significance
To address issues of statistical significance, we apply the Bootstrap Algorithm developed in Section 4. for year 5 could be related to the severe macroeconomic conditions in 2008-09 which corresponded to the onset of a major global recession. There is considerable overlap in the distributions from one year to the next although to assess the statistical significance of changes in the R 2 we will focus on the mean, and the standard error of the mean (SEM). Figure 4 shows the corresponding plot for survival. The trend here seems to be that the goodness-offit for survival regressions increases in the years since start-up, although once more there is a
For each bootstrapped distribution of Nagelkerke R 2 statistics, we report the mean and the SEM in Tables 6 and 7 (see also Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix). Tables 6 and 7 below present the outcome of two-sample t-tests with unequal variance to see if the mean of the R 2 statistic is significantly different from the mean R 2 in the first observable year, and also if it differs significantly from the mean R 2 in the previous year. Regarding the growth rate regressions (Table 6 ), our results
show that the year-on-year change in R 2 is significantly negative apart from year 5, which jumps upwards. When we c ' 2 with the R 2 observed for the first observed period (that is, year 2) we see that the R 2 in each case is significantly lower. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the R 2 of growth rate regressions decreases over time. Regarding the survival regressions (Table   7) , the R 2 generally increases over time, but it dips in year 5 to take an unexpectedly low value.
Therefore the increase is not monotonic over the years. However, in each year after year 2, the R 2 is significantly higher tha T Figure 3 : Evolution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R 2 distribution for growth regressions (full model).
Bootstrapped sample size n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline (left) and abovemedian start-up size (right). 
CONCLUSION
The starting point for this paper is that the performance of new ventures is highly diverse and that our ability to foresee the survival/growth of new ventures is weak. In the terminology of this paper the fog was thick. However there are clear benefits to business owners, providers of finance and to governments in developing a better understanding of the factors influencing the performance of new ventures. The challenge therefore was to examine whether as the new venture aged it became easier to predict performance: did the fog lift?
We began by identifying two measures of new firm performance survival and growth and then G ' G' explanatory power (R 2 statistic) in the years after entry. GR assumes that new venture growth is a random walk, whereas new venture survival depends on a combination of chance and access to financial resources. GR therefore suggests that the fog over growth is thick and remains thick over time. With regards to survival, however, GR predicts that survival becomes more predictable in the inevitable vicissitudes of trade that characterise the new venture in its early months and years.
Tested on a large sample of a cohort of UK new ventures over the years 2004-2010, our results show that the goodness-of-fit of growth rate regressions generally decreases in the years since start-up. However, the goodness-of-fit of survival regressions increase in years since start-up. Taken together, over time it becomes easier to predict survival but more difficult to predict growth. It is not possible to accurately predict both survival and growth.
One unexpected, but highly interesting, result year 5 the growth rate regression R 2 is higher than expected, and the survival R 2 is lower than expected. This blip seems to interrupt what is otherwise a monotonic trend, perhaps due to the financial crisis.
Another contribution of this paper, although it is not our main contribution, is that different factors matter for survival and growth in different years. Furthermore, we observe that many variables usually suspected to have a significant effect on the growth and survival of new firms (such as education, sources of advice and prior business experience) had little effect on growth or survival in line with the stochastic dynamics that drive GR.
Our view is that the novelty of these results is strongly, but not exclusively, linked to the quality of the data we have available to us. Cohort data has the advantage that all new ventures face the same macroeconomic phenomena at the same stage of development, the only downside being the insurmountable identification problems of distinguishing between macroeconomic factors and developmental factors in a single cohort of firms.
What remains clear however is that raising the R 2 and, by implication, giving the impression that the fog is less thick, can likely be achieved by having samples of new firms that are unrepresentative of the population. These include having firms that are not really new; that are comparatively large; that are survivors; that have employees; that provide data themselves that cannot be verified; that are restricted to one industry or sector etc. Unfortunately, as we show, almost all other data sets on new venture performance exhibit at least one, and generally considerably more than one, of these characteristics. The fact that our data set suffers from none of these limitations goes some way to explaining why the fog appears to be thicker amongst our firms than those examined in much other work.
As we show in the paper the fog appears to be considerably less thick once firms become larger and more established giving, what we believe to be, a misleading impression that the talents and skills of the founder(s) dominate the role of chance. Instead our view is that new venture founders can do all E least for some time. It is this that causes the fog. Table 4 : Growth Rate regressions for each year. Columns (1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, while columns (6) to (10) focus on firms with above-median start-up size. (5) contain the baseline regressors, while columns (6) to (9) control for lagged growth. Table A4 : Survival regressions for each year, for firms with above-median start-up size. Columns (1) to (5) contain the baseline regressors, while columns (6) to (9) control for lagged growth. Figure A1 : Evolution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R 2 distribution for growth regressions (full model).
Bootstrapped sample size n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline plus lagged growth (left) and above-median start-up size with lagged growth (right). Figure A2 : Distribution of bootstrapped Nagelkerke R 2 statistics obtained from probit survival regressions, n=1000, replications r=1000. Box plots refer to baseline plus lagged growth (left) and above-median start-up size with lagged growth (right).
